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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF ARCHITECTURAL
PLANS, DRAWINGS, AND DESIGNS
ARTHUR S. KATz *
"The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot
permanently justify its existence . . . Logic and history and custom have their place.
We will shape the law to conform to them when we may; but only within bounds. The
enpd which the law serves will dominate them all."
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 66 (1921).
"Perhaps the most significant advance in the modern science of law is the change
from the analytical to the functional attitude."
Dean Pound, quoted in CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 73 (192x).
How much protection is available to the creator of architectural plans, drawings,
and designs under copyright principles? Is this protection similar in scope to that
granted such producers of intellectual property as authors, artists, and composers?
It is the purpose of this article to answer these questions.
Tim CONCEPT oF COPYRIGHT
An appreciation of the scope of protection available to the architect under copy-
right principles can best be accomplished by first examining the nature of copyright.
Drone, the dean of American text writers on matters of intellectual property, has
defined copyright as follows:'
Copyright is the exclusive right of the owner to multiply and to dispose of copies of an
intellectual production. It is the sole right to the copy or to copy it. The word is used in-
differently to signify the statutory and the common-law right of the owner in a literary or
musical composition or work of art. As there are essential differences between the two
rights, one is sometimes called copyright after publication, or statutory copyright; and
the other copyright before publication, or common-law copyright. Copyright is also used
synonymously with literary property ... This is not strictly correct....
The right granted is quite limited. For example, an author of a book is given
the exclusive right to exploit his work by making copies of it. The law prevents
others from copyirg his work since he has the sole copy-right. However, as will
be demonstrated, the author's copyright does not bar others from using the ideas
or thoughts contained in his work. It is solely the expression or arrangement which
is protected from copying.2
*A.B. 1948, Brooklyn College; LL.B. 595o, New York University School of Law. Member of the
New York and California bars. Department Head, Copyright & Television Department, Columbia Pictures
Corporation, Hollywood, Calif. Counsel to architectural firms. West coast editor, Bulletin of the Copy-
right Society of the United States of America. Member, Los Angeles Copyright Society. Author of
various articles on copyright law and constitutional law.
'EATON S. DRONE, A TREATIsE ON TnE LAw OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIOtS rIN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATEs oo-roi (1879) [cited hereinafter as DRONE ON COPIGlrr].
'For a discussion of these principles, see pages 239-241, infra, and notes and cases there cited.
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The term "copyright" is a misnomer. There are many intellectual productions
which are imperfectly exploited, from the pecuniary point-and as works of art,
when rendered solely as printed copies. For instance, musical and dramatic works
are primarily intended to be performed. A painter's or sculptor's design for a work
of art is intended to be executed or completed. Dollar-wise or culturally, the non-
executed design would have little value. Consequently, the law recognizes the exist-
ence of "play-rights," "performance rights," and "execution rights" in appropriate
intellectual productions.? And it protects these rights. Notoriously no respecter
of persons, the law is also rude with semantics. Under the cloak of copyright, it
shields play-rights, performance rights, and execution rights as well.4
Broad though it is, the Anglo-American concept of copyright should also be
seen in its proper perspective. The law of copyright must be recognized as filling
but a limited area in the field of intellectual property. Under Anglo-American law,
an author can rarely, in the absence of contract, protest the misuse or mutilation
of his copyrighted work.5 The protection granted a creator under copyright prin-
ciples is limited to pecuniary matters. Protection of a creator's non-patrimonial in-
terest in his work, that is, protection against an invasion of his right of personality
by an indiscriminate use of his work, is not found in Anglo-American copyright law.
However, these non-patrimonial interests are adequately safeguarded in most coun-
tries by exercise of the moral right doctrine, le droit moral! Further, certain un-
ethical commercial abuses of intellectual productions are not cognizable under copy-
right principles. 7
To restrict the creator of an intellectual production solely to the limited protection
afforded by the law of copyright is to leave him ill armed to combat the host of
parasites who would feed gratuitously on his creation.
Although the body of copyright law is too small to cover the intellectual prop-
erty field, it has, nevertheless, expanded in other ways: It has grown two separate
heads. One head is labeled common-law copyright; the other, statutory copyright.
As Drone has stated:'
... there are important differences between the statutory and common-law right. The
former exists only in works which have been published within the meaning of the
statute; and the latter, only in works which have not been so published. In the former
case, ownership is limited to a term of years; in the latter, it is perpetual. The two rights
do not coexist in the same composition; when the statutory right begins, the common-law
'For a discussion of these rights, see pages 239, 247, infra, and notes and cases there cited.
'To say nothing of a host of other rights, such as those of translation, dramatization, adaptation,
etc. See 17 U. S. C. §I (Supp. 1952).
'Compare Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors, Inc., 283 Fed. 2i9 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) and Drummond
v. Altemus, 6o Fed. 338 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1894) with Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 Fed. 728
(C. C. N. D. Ill. 1883).
' See Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 375 (1951), FouRTH CoPYRIGoHr LAw SY'Iosm' 78 (ASCAP 1952); Roeder, The Doctrine of
Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HAxv. L. REv. 554 (1940); Granz
v. Harris, 198 F. ad 585, 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1952).
'See page 249, note 153 and cases and authorities cited in the Appendix, infra.8 DRONE ON COPYRIGHT 100.
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right ends. Both may be defeated by publication. Thus, when a work is published in
print, the owner's common-law rights are lost; and, unless the publication be in accordance
with the requirements of the statute, the statutory right is not secured.
An examination of Anglo-American legal history explains this duality of copy-
right. The first English copyright statute (8 Anne, c. i9) was passed in X709. It
was designed to aid authors of published works by giving them the right to have
penal sanctions applied to infringers. The Court of King's Bench interpreted this
statute in 1769 in Millar v. Taylor.' It held that the act was declaratory of the
common law, that it was a penal statute which gave an additional remedy to an
author in his fight against literary piracy, and that it was not intended to divest
the author of his perpetual common law right in his property, whether published
or unpublished1
In 1774 the statute was again subjected to scrutiny. The case of Donaldson v.
Becket 1 came before the House of Lords upon an appeal from a decree by the
Lord Chancellor which had made perpetual the injunction granted in Millar v.
Taylor. It was the defendant's argument that "The Statute of Anne was not declara-
tory of the common law, but introductive of a new law, to give learned men a
property they had not before."' 2 By a count of six to five, the eleven judges hearing
the argument of the case voted to reverse Millar v. Taylor. They held that the
statute did take away an author's common law right in his published work1
The law in the United States is in accord with Donaldson v. Becket. The statute
of 8 Anne, c. x9, not being a part of the common law, was never applicable to
the United States. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in Wheaton v.
Peters 4 cited the above decision as its authority for holding that the first federal
copyright law, the Copyright Act of i79o,'" destroyed common law rights in pub-
lished works. Thus, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, copy-
right in published works was early deemed to be a creature of statute.
Since the passage of the Copyright Act of 1911,0 there has been no common
law copyright in the United Kingdom, all intellectual productions, published or
unpublished, being protected only by statutory fiat. In this country, contrarily, the
difference between common law and statutory copyright remains.
04 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K. B. 1769).
"oFor a detailed examination of this decision see DRONE ON COPYIoHT 28 et seq.; see also Katz,
supra note 6, at 382-384.
114 Burr. 24o8, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 2 Bro. P. C. 129, x Eng. Rep. 837 (x774).
2 Donaldson v. Becket is reported in at least two versions. The portion quoted appears in 2 Bro.
P. C. 129, at 140.
" For a detailed examination of this decision see DRONE ON CoPmor 37 el seq.; see also Katz, supra
note 6, at 384-385.
148 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834).1 5 Prior to the passage of this act by the Second Session of the First Congress on May 31, 1790, 1 STAr.
124, twelve of the original thirteen states (Delaware being the exception) had passed copyright
laws. With the adoption of the Federal Constitution these states statutes were, of course, superseded by
federal legislation. For the text of these statutes see CoPYRoHr LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA
1-24 (Copyright Office 1952).
161 & 2 GEo. 5, c. 46, §§, 31.
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Statutory copyright is a federal right created by authority of the United States
Constitution.Y7  Th& current copyright law' has preserved a creator's rights, under
common law and equitable principles, in his unpublished workY' Since there is no
federal common law,2° the state courts are the appropriate forums in which to
resolve common law copyright questions.2' Although one might wish that certain
state courts displayed a keener understanding of the concept of copyright, there
appears to be little basis to the assertion that common law copyright22 is either non-
existent in most states or erratically adjudicated from state to state. Common law
copyright questions have not been raised in every state; nevertheless, no decision or
piece of legislation has been reported where a state or territory in the Union has
denied the existence of common law copyright."
We have noted, thus far, the following basic differences which distinguish com-
mon law copyright from statutory copyright:24
(a) Common law copyright exists solely in unpublished works; statutory copyright (with
certain specific exceptions) exists only in published works.
(b) Common law copyright protection is automatically accorded all unpublished works
"' "The Congress shall have power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." U. S. CoNs'r., Art. 1, §8.
"
8 Act of March 4, 1909, 35 STAT. 1075 (1909) [which act, as amended, is codified as 17 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1952)].
19 17 U. S. C. §2 (Supp, 1952):
"Rights of Author or Proprietor of Unpublished Work.-Nothing in this title shall be con-
strued to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at
common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor."
"
0 Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
" However, if the amount in controversy exceeds $3,ooo exclusive of interest and costs, and there
is diversity of citizenship, suit may also be brought in a federal court.
Conversely, where litigation concerns a breach of contract or the abuse of a relationship connected
with a statutory copyrighted work, the state courts have jurisdiction. Condon v. Associated Hospital
Service, 287 N. Y. 411, 414, 4o N. E. 2d 23o (942).
"The writer uses the terms "common law" and "common law copyright" to signify that broad,
unwritten and judge-made body of English law based on usage and timeless custom which is dis-
tinguished from legislative enactments. With the exception of portions held repugnant to American
religious, social or political mores, this body of law has been carried over into American state and
federal jurisprudence. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92 (i9os). The
writer does not use these terms to represent the unwritten and judge-made law of the United States.
"' According to a report prepared by Leonard Zissu, Esq., for presentation at the 1953 American
Bar Association meeting in Boston, Mass. . ..no statutes or judicial decisions of any states or territories
of the U. S. A. have yet been produced to support the contention that common law protection in un-
published works or its equivalent in noncommon law states or territories does not presently exist. Indeed,
the statutes and judicial decisions which do exist uniformly indicate a general policy among the states
and territories to furnish such protection ...no state or territory has legislatively denied or abrogated
such protection and only six jurisdictions have no legislation thereon whatsoever (Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Missouri, Tennessee and Puerto Rico)." [Mr. Zissu was quoting from a report
by Wilma Stine.)
The courts of New York State, for instance, follow common law copyright precepts, although there
is no statutory declaration of them. Oertel v. Wood, 40 How. Prac. io (N. Y. 1877); Chamberlain v.
Feldman, 300 N. Y. 135, 89 N. E. 2d 863 (1949).
The State of California, on the other hand, has codified the concept of common law copyright. See
CAL. CIv. CODE §§98o, et seq.
"' See however, note 22, supra.
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from the moment of their creation. The mere act of publication will not automatically
grant statutory prote.ction to a work; there must be, in addition, strict compliance
with the statutory formalities.
(c) Common law copyright protection is perpetual; statutory copyright is for a term of
years.
(d) Common law copyright is regulated by the several states; statutory copyright is solely
a matter for the Federal Government.
There are two other basic differences between the two branches of copyright.
These are differences which appreciably affect the practical question of determining
how and when an intellectual production is infringed.
Common law copyright is a negative sort of protection. It grants nothing to
the creator of intellectual property which he did not previously possess. Instead, it
aids him in preserving inviolate his unpublished work. In essence, the common
law protects his tight of secrecy, his right to control the first publication of his
work. 2 After an authorized publication, common law protection ceases2
Statutory copyright may be described as granting positive protection. Under its
principles, intellectual productions may be exploited free from the threat of mis-
appropriation. The courts have agreed that statutory copyright has given the
creator of published intellectual works a new property right2 In consideration
of the receipt and enjoyment of this grant of new protection, the state has required
that the creator give something in return. The quid pro quo is the right given to
others to make a "fair use" of the material protected by statutory copyright.2 8 Knowl-
"As superbly stated by Lord Mansfield in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr 2303, 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. 201,
252 (K. B. 769):
"From what source, then, is the common law drawn, which is admitted to be so clear,
in respect of the copy before publication?
"From this argument-because it is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary
profits of his own ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name,
without his consent. It is fit he should judge when to publish, or whether he will
ever publish. It is fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication;
how many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will
trust the accuracy and correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will confide,
not to foist in additions: with other reasonings of the same effect.
. .. But the same reasons hold, after the author has published. He can reap no pe-
cuniary profit, if, the next moment after the work comes out, it may be pirated upon
worse paper and in worse print, and in a cheaper volume.
"... The author may not only be deprived of any profit, but lose the expence he has
been at. He is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control over the
correctness of his own work. He cannot prevent additions. He cannot retract errors. He
cannot amend; or cancel a faulty edition. Any one may print, pirate and perpetuate the
imperfections, to the disgrace andl against the will of the author; may propagate sentiments
under his name, which he disapproves, repents and is ashamed of. He can exercise no
discretion as to the manner in which, or the persons by whom his work shall be published."
(Italics supplied.)
" 'The owner's common-law rights are not lost by a publication which is made without his
authority. In that case, the act is not his, and he cannot rightly be held responsible for what is done
without his knowledge or consent. But long acquiescence may amount to abandonment." DRONE ON
COPYRIGHT 121.
"'Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 2 Bro. P. C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774);
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. x834).
"S "The aim of the law is to encourage learning by allowing a fair use to be made of a copyrighted
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edge, obviously, is most valuable when shared. Of course, abuse of this "conditional
privilege" to draw material from the storehouse of another will constitute an "unfair
use," a "misappropriation of intellectual property," and hence, an infringement. One
of the most difficult questions in statutory copyright is to determine when a taking
is "fair" and permissible, or "unfair" and an infringement. The legal test is simple:
where the matter taken is a substantial or material part of the protected work, there
is an infringement. Its application is difficult. This test will be discussed in detail
in a later portion of this article. 9
In as much as common law copyright is not a new right given by the state, there
is no requirement for a quid pro quo. Accordingly, the doctrine of "fair use" is
not found in common law copyright. The law has been clearly stated by the
Supreme Court of California:. 0
... common-law rights in unpublished works are of a wider and more exclusive nature
than the rights conferred by statutory copyright in published works (court's italics). The
common law prohibits any kind of unauthorized interference with, or use of, an unpub-
lished work on the ground of an exclusive property right... A statutory copyright per-
mits a "fair use" of the copyright publication without deeming it an infringement.
(Italics supplied.)
Whether the right to protest any unauthorized use of an unpublished work is
a property right,31 or a right of personality, 2 the fact remains that the improper
taking of only a scintilla of unpublished material is a wrong for which the law
gives a remedy. It is questioned whether the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex
is here applicable since the wrong is not so much the taking of property as it is the
violation of the author's right of secrecy.
With this discussion of the basic differences between common law and statutory
copyright we have concluded our analysis of the concept of copyright. We shall
now proceed to examine the nature and scope of the protection available under
common law copyright to architectural plans, drawings, and designs.
COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT
The architect 33 expresses his thoughts and reveals his artistic personality in his
"writings.""M In this respect, he is similar to all other creators of intellectual prop-
work, but at the same time to prevent the subsequent author from saving himself labor by appropriating
without consideration the fruits of another's skill and industry." DRONE ON CouRuoiwr 398. .See also
DRONE at 386, 387. Lawrence v. Dana, i5 Fed. Cas. No. 8,136 at 26, 6o-61 (C. C. D. Mass. 1869).
See pages 242, 243, infra, and cases and notes there cited.
8oStanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 35 Cal. 2d 653, 661, 221 P. 2d 73, 78 (1950).
"Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599,97 N. E. xo9 (1912).
"' See Katz, supra note 6, at 375, 390, 399-402.
"
5Wherever the term "architect" appears in this article it should be recognized as referring to
"designers" as well.
The courts have long given a liberal interpretation to the term "writings" as contained in the
constitutional provision authorizing copyright protection. For the pertinent text of this provision see
note 17, supra. The leading decision on the point is Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, xii
U. S. 53 (1884). See also Title 17 U. S. C. §4 which declares that works which are copyrightable
under the act "include all the writings of an author."
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erties. Unlike the writer of books, the architect is not limited to words. In addition
to words, he uses, among other things, technical signs and symbols and graphic
representations to communicate his ideas. The architect might be compared to the
composer of music. The architect's signs, symbols, and graphic representations are
to the builder what a composer's notes and performance instructions are to the
musician.
The writer has chosen to group all of the architects's writings under the collective
caption of "plans, drawings, and designs." Architects, generally, use the word
"drawings" to cover all written expressions of their art. However, the word has
acquired too narrow an interpretation in the average person's vocabulary to warrant
its use as a complete description of an architect's writings. Nor is the term "design"
an apt means of describing all of an architect's writings. Like a carefully phrased
campaign promise, it means different things to different people. For the purposes
of this article, a design is not only a two dimensional drawing or sketch of an
architectural work in the round, or a three dimensional model of such work. It
is also any eye-pleasing drawing, detail, pattern, form, or arrangement of materials
which is primarily intended to have an artistic or ornamental effect. The artistic
use of wood strips, or "trim" on the exterior of a house to enhance its charm
is an example of the latter use of the term "design.""5
In addition to drawings and designs, an architect uses the "plan," a two di-
mensional medium, to express his ideas for the erection of three dimensional struc-
tures. For structures such as houses, the most basic plan is the "floor or ground
plan." This is a graphic or schematic drawing which delineates the form, size, room
arrangement, and construction features of one floor of a structure as if seen from
overhead, ceiling or roof removed. The floor plan gives a horizontal structural
description. To describe vertical planes, such as walls, windows, doors or fagades,
"elevations" are employed. These may be "framing elevations" which reveal the
construction details, or "skeleton" of a structure, or they may represent the com-
pleted vertical planes with their "skin" on. And, of course, there are interior and
exterior elevations.
The modes of expression or writing available to the architect are many. Yet
the law is clear that his unpublished work, be it denominated plan, drawing or
design, is protected under common law copyright principles from any unauthorized
" Designs, in the latter sense, may be protectible under either the copyright or patent laws, or
under both. Copyright protection is not dependent upon the intended use of the object upon which
the copyrighted design is placed. Rosenthal v. Stein, 98 U. S. P. Q. 1So, 2o5 F.2d 633 (9 th Cir.
1953). Contra: Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 96 F. Supp. 97 (N. D. 111. a95i), afl'd 188 F. 2d 6x (7th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 829 (1951). See 17 U. S. C. §5(g) (Supp. 1952); see also Regula-
tions of the Copyright Office in 37 CoDE oF FEDERAL REGULATIONS C. II, §202.8 (1948). See also 35
U. S. C. §171 (Supp. 1952).
For the difference between design patents and patents for other inventions, see the "Kcwpie doll"
case, Wilson v. Haber Bros., Inc., 275 Fed. 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1921).
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use.3 6 The wrong-doer will be enjoined"' and, in some cases, held liable for
damages2
8
Of course, the work must be originalP9 as well as unpublished, that is, it must
be the result of independent labor and not of copying ° However, the work need
not be the first of its kind 1 Although the concept of "newness" or novelty is a
prerequisite in the law of patents, 42 it has no place in the fields of common law43
or statutory copyright.44
Novelty is a concept incapable of clear-cut definition. Novelty does have some
measurable basis where its scope is limited in territory and time4  To require an
author, who has created something original, to warrant and prove that it is also
novel, that it has never been done before anywhere at any time, is to confront him
with an obstacle too difficult to overcome. History has recorded numerous incidents
where two gifted men, working unaware of the other's efforts, have arrived, almost
simultaneously, at the same results or discoveries. Yet if absolute novelty must
be proven before either could restrain the unauthorized publication of his work,
neither would receive protection. It should be sufficient that the work of each
author is new to him, that is, that it is original with him, and not copied from the
work of another 6
" DRONE ON COPYRIGHT, 101, 102. See also page 229 and note 30, supra.
"See cases cited in note 31 supra.
" Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815, 962, 3o Eng. Rep. 681 (1854); Caliga v. Inter Ocean News-
paper, 215 U. S. 182 (3909). For a discussion of the measure of damages see Taft v. Smith, Gray &
Co., 134 N. Y. Supp. 3o3 (App. Term. Sup. Ct. 1912).
• . . originality is alone the test of validity [of a copyright]," Learned Hand, J., in Fisher v.
Dillingham, 298 Fed. X45, 149-152 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); DRONE ON CoPYRIGr, 198, 199. See Yankwich,
Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, ss F. R. D. 457 (1951)-
See also pages 240-242 infra, and cases and notes there cited.
to DRONE ON COPRIGHT, 208.
""No one doubts that two directories, independently made, are each entitled to copyright, regard-
less of their similarity, even though it amount to identity. Each being the result of original work, the
second will be protected, quite regardless of its lack of novelty." Learned Hand, J., in Fisher v.
Dillingham, 298 Fed. 345, 350, 151 (S. D. N. Y. 3924).
"'See 35 U. S. C. §§io, 302 (Supp. 1952).
"DRONE ON CoPYRiGrr, 199, 2oo.
"' "Unlike the subject matter of a patent, copyrighted material need not be new, but only original."
Clark, C. J., in Picker v. General Electric Co., 162 F. 2d 341 (2d Cir. 1947); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales
Corp., 15o F. 3d 512 (2d Cir. 1945); Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S. D. N. Y. 3924).
For a further discussion of the concept of novelty in works protected by statutory copyright see page
240 infra, and cases and notes there cited.
"See 35 U. S. C. §102 (1952) where an invention is deemed to be new, and within the purview
of the United States Patent Law, if, among other things, the invention (i) has not been known or used
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or any country prior
to its invention by the applicant, or (2) has not been patented or described in a printed publication in
this or any country for more than one year prior to the invention's United States patent application.
" Melville B. Nimmer, Esq., in his ground breaking article, The Law of Ideas, 27 So. CALiF. L. REv.
119 (1954), points up the confusion engendered by many courts by their misuse of the terms originality
and novelty.
Confusion must result as to the true nature of copyright where the courts interject the element of
novelty as an aid to establishing the originality of a work in those cases where both the plaintiff's and
defendant's properties use similar stock incidents and characters. It is submitted that when courts speak
of the requirement of "a new conception or novel arrangement" they mean only that an author's
work must be suffldently different in expression or development as to indicate that it is original
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An original unpublished "naked idea" is not protectible at common law.47 The
undeveloped idea that a house should be built in a circular form to permit all the
rooms to receive sunshine at some time in the day is an example. At this stage, the
idea is nothing but a thought--ephemeral, intangible, impermanent. To be pro-
tected at common law, the unpublished original work must be expressed in a con-
crete or tangible manner. This does not mean that the author's thought must be
set forth in some kind of writing, and that each premise must be completely de-
veloped. The requirement of concreteness for intellectual productions would appear
to be satisfied where the creator's thoughts are contained in such non-abstract form
as would permit the impress of his mark of ownership. 8
Should the unpublished work be "not capable of distinguishable proprietary
marks"49 because of its vagueness of expression, it would be proper to deem it non-
concrete. It would be non-protectible because non-possessible, and non-possessible
because it lacked indicia certa. As an able English jurist has stated:"0
The subject of property is the order of words in the author's composition; not the words
themselves, they being analogous to the elements of matter, which are not appropriated
unless combined, nor the ideas expressed by those words, they existing in the mind alone,
which is not capable of appropriation.
As indicated, the architect employs a specialized form of writing. He expresses
himself, primarily, by the use of technical signs, symbols, and graphic representations.
Substitute these terms for the term "words" in the above quotation, and one will
note its applicability to an architect's intellectual productions.
Protecting the unpublished works of an architect would be a relatively simple
matter were the law clear as to what acts constituted publication. Counsel could
advise, "do this-avoid doing that," and all would be well-the common law copy-
right would be preserved against any unauthorized reproduction. But, alas, the law
is not clear. The theory of publication is simple enough, but its correct application
to a particular set of facts is another matter.
The writer has been able to find but three reported cases in the United States
and not copied from the protected work of another or from public domain material to which the plaintiff
had access. A case in point is: Simonton v. Gordon, 297 Fed. 625 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
"It follows that the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the
penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly" (italics supplied), Learned Hand, C. J.,
in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
"'However, an unpublished "naked idea" which has been revealed through a breach of trust or
confidence is protectible under common law principles. Here the protection is not the affirmative kind
afforded property. It is negative in nature; the wrong-doer is prevented from profiting from his tortious
acts. For a discussion of this point see page 228 supra and cases and authorities cited in the Appendix at
pages 251-252, infra. See also COsINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 38, 39 (8th ed.
1948) [this authoritative English text is cited hereinafter as COPINoEr. ON COPYRIGHT].
" "The best rule both of reason and justice seems to be, to assign to everything capable of ownership
a legal and determinate owner." (Italics supplied.) MAUGHAM, A TR.UAnSE ON TM LAws oV LsRAITW
PROPERTY 4 (1828). See also the fine survey of Anglo-American decisions in Pannone, Property Rights
in an Idea and the Requirement of Concreteness, 33 BOSTON U. L. REV. 396 (1953).
"Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2365, 2366, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K. B. 1769). But a work is pro-
tectible if it does have "a capacity to be distinguished," id. at 2340.
5
°Erle, J., in Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 815, 867, io Eng. Rep. 681, 702 (1854).
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discussing what constitutes a publication of architectural plans, drawings, and de-
signs. All of them are lower court decisions. A New York Appellate Division
case"' held that the filing of unpublished plans in a municipal building department
which required such filing before construction could be approved, was such a pub-
lication of the plans as to destroy the architect's common law rights in them. A
Missouri Appellate court52 and a Philadelphia City court53 have held that the
building of a structure from hitherto unpublished plans, and its exposure to public
gaze, was also such a publication as destroyed the common law copyright in the
plans.
It is submitted that these cases are wrong in principle and destructive in practice
of an architect's intellectual property. Should these three lower court cases be
deemed to represent the true state of the law, an architect may never properly
exploit his unpublished intellectual productions. The two acts which the nature
of an architect's calling require him to perform, in order to earn his living, are
turned, by these three decisions, into the very means of depriving him of the right
to profit from his own labor at the exact moment such profit is realizable.5 4
From the business point of view, these decisions are unjust. And, as concerns
the law, they are unsound. This contention is supported by an examination of the
authorities on the concept of "publication."
"Publication," as a legal term, is possessed of many definitions. It means one
thing in the law of wills, another thing in the law of defamation, and yet another
in the law of copyright. The act of publication communicates the contents of a
work to others, generally by the circulation of copies. However, the copyright law
distinguishes between communications which divest one of his common law rights
in his work, and communications which do not. The former act is deemed a
general publication, the latter, a limited publication. "The use of the word 'publica-
tion' in these two senses is unfortunate, and has led to much confusion.""
By definition, a general publication is :
... such a disclosure, communication, circulation, exhibition, or distribution of the subject
" Wright v. Eisle, 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N. Y. Supp. 887 (2d Dep't 1903). For the writer's views
as to the wisdom of this decision see note 54 and page 235, infra.
52 Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S. W. 2d 282 (938). See note 53, infra.
' Gendell v. Orr, 13 Phila. 191 (1879). The writer did not find the reasoning of this case or of
Kurfiss v. Cowherd, supra note 52, persuasive on the point that erection of a building is a publication
of its technical writings. See page 236 infra, and notes thereto.
" If the filing of plans, drawings, and designs in governmental offices, or the erection of the structure
they describe is held to throw these technical writings into the public domain, the architect is literally
forced to divest himself of his exclusive property, contrary to his own desires. He cannot build unless
he files; the moment he files he loses his common law rights. His writing then being free for the taking,
he can rarely sell more than one copy of these writings, nor receive more than one royalty for their
use. See also page 235 infra.
"
5 Townsend, J., in Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324 (2d Cir. x904).
To the same end, Hough, C. J., in Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 Fed. 244, 250,
251 (2d Cir. 1917).
"'Townsend, J., in Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 326 (2d Cir. 2904).
See National Institute v. Nutt, 28 F. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 1928), afi'd, 31 F. 2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929). See
also cases cited in note 63 infra.
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of copyright, tendered or given to one or more members of the general public, as implies
an abandonment of the right of copyright or its dedication to the public.
A limited publication is:"
* . . one which communicates a knowledge of its contents under conditions expressly or
impliedly precluding its dedication to the public.
The above definitions are certainly succinct. But, as a matter of practice, how
may one type of publication be distinguished from another? The nature of the
work concerned has some bearing on the question.;" For example, the performance
of a dramatic piece or a musical composition is never any kind of a publication
thereof. Here the law admits of no doubt.5 9 However, the certainty one seeks
in the law becomes less apparent when other intellectual productions are examined.
For instance, it is not wholly clear whether the act of exhibition per se of a painting
is a publication, and, if so, whether it is general or limited.0 ° In so far as the
technical writings of an architect are concerned, they are neither dramatic or
musical works, nor intended solely for exhibition purposes. It is evident, therefore,
that they are capable of being published, in the fullest legal sense of that term.
But the nature of the intellectual production aside, what other factors determine
whether a communication is a publication, and if so, whether it is general or lim-
ited? Is the printing of copies a general publication? Does the amount of copies
matter? May a work be published generally by the circulation of manuscript
copies?
It is submitted that the mechanical means employed to reproduce a work, or the
number of copies made and distributed are not determinative of the question of
general publication!' The test is one of intention. The Supreme Court of the
United States has declared:"'
It is a fundamental rule that to constitute publication there must be such a dissemination
of the work of art itself among the public as to justify the belief that it took place with
the intention of rendering such work common property. [Italics supplied.]
Clearly, an author is not to be lighdy divested of his common law protection,
and hence of his property, without clear indicia of his intentions. For the law to
"Townsend, J., in Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904).
See also Judge Yankwich's scholarly treatment of the point in White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 5o2
(S. D. Calif. 195o), ret'd on other grounds, 193 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952).
"'Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 212 Fed. 301 (S. D. N. Y. 1914), afl'd, ax8 Fed. 577
(2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U. S. 704 (1914).
" Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (z912) established this point in American law. The same
rule obtains by statute in Great Britain, Copyright Act, X911, I & 2 GEo. 5, c. 46, §1(3).
"0 See, e.g., WEIL, AmERICAN CoPYRIGTrr LAw 149-150 (1917). See also, DRONE ON CoPYRIGuor
285-292.28 2... a work is published when it is communicated to the general public ... the general unrestricted
circulation of printed copies is such a publication, and the principle would seem to be the same when
manuscript copies are circulated. But it is clear that a private circulation for a restricted purpose is not a
[general] publication . . . notwithstanding that the copies so distributed are printed." DRONE ON
COPYRIGHT 115, 121, 290.
"IMr. justice Day in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299-300 (1907).
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find a general publication, the facts surrounding the publication must reveal a
desire to abandon all rights in the work. A creator of intellectual productions who,
by conduct, custom or contract, restricts the use or circulation of his work has made
no general publication.63 Thus, an architect who discloses his unpublished plans,
drawings or designs to a prospective client, or series of clients, does not do so with
the intention of abandoning his rights in his work. Such publication as he makes
is clearly a limited one.
Does an architect intend to make a general publication when, in conformity with
the dictates of a building ordinance, he files his plans in a governmental office?
Obviously not. The purpose of the filing requirement is to protect the public
from unsafe construction-not to divest the architect of his property. Conversely, if
the filing is intended as a condition precedent to the State's action of granting a
limited monopoly to the creator, as where a patent right is concerned, the filing is
tantamount to a general publication.6 4 This is wholly proper. Since the creator has
obtained the exclusive right to exploit his work for a limited time, he is not harmed
by having his production exposed to public examination. The filing of architectural
plans for building permit purposes should be held, at most, to be a limited publica-
tion. The architect files solely with the intention of receiving governmental approval
of his plans.
The requirement that plans must be filed and approved before a building permit
is issued is a valid exercise of a municipality's police powers. It is submitted, how-
ever, that such an ordinance is patently unconstitutional where it is construed as
working a general publication of an architect's plans. In effect, such an ordinance
takes an architect's property without due process of law."'
The problem of determining whether the filing of plans in a governmental office
is a general publication is avoided, of course, where the building ordinance clearly
indicates a contrary intention. Thus, the Los Angeles City Building Code declares :66
"Plans and specifications on file with the Department ... shall not be public records."
We turn now to the question whether the architect intends to make a general
"The law recognizes a vital distinction between the public and the private circulation of copies.
The owner may circulate copies of a work among a limited number of persons, with the understanding
and on the condition that it is not to be made public. In such case no publication takes place, not-
withstanding that the copies so distributed are printed." DRONE ON COPYRIrT 290.
Perhaps the classic illustration of this principle is Thomas Jefferson's "Notes on Virginia." In answer
to a query by a Frenchman, Jefferson wrote an accurate study of his state's history, geography, and
economy. Because of the great interest evidenced by European diplomatic circles in his account, he
caused 200 copies to be privately printed and distributed to selected readers-all of whom were asked
not to publish or otherwise disseminate the work.
The concept of publication should not be so narrowly interpreted as to "limit a lawful business
to a few degrees of longitude." Hough, C. J., in Associated Press v. International News Service, 245
Fed. 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1917). Accord, Board of Trade v. Tucker, 22r Fed. 305, 307 (2d Cir. x915).
[. . . the posting of [trade] quotations . . . [to subscribers] on a blackboard . . . is not the sort of
publication which will terminate complainant's property right in them"] Board of Trade v. McDearmott
Commission Co., 143 Fed. i88 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 19o6).
"L Korzybski v. Underwood, 36 F. 2d 727, 729 (2d Cir. x929).
" See note 54 supra. See also Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court,
40 HARV. L. REv. 943 (1927).
"
t Section 91.02I(f) (1952).
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publication of his plans by building the structure they describe. The answer must
be in the negative. It is only by repeated uses of the same set of plans (or modifica-
tions thereof) that the architect commences to profit from his intellectual production.
But business intentions aside-is it legally sound to suppose that a completed
structure is a publication of its plans? It is submitted that it is not. For a work
to be published it must be reproduced, that is, there must be an issuance of copies
to the general public.or A completed structure is no more a copy"" of its underlying
plans than a phonograph record is a copy of its underlying musical notations. An
architectural plan is a technical writing. It is capable of being copied only by
similar technical writings, that is, by other plans, etc. A structure is the result of
plans, not a copy of them.69 It follows that building a structure and opening it to
public gaze cannot be a publication of its plans.70
"
7 The United States copyright law, 17 U. S. C. (Supp. 1952), does not define the term publication.
(It does define "date of publication" in i7 U. S. C. §26). The concept that publication requires an
issuance of copies of the work to the public is found in the United Kingdom's Copyright Act, x911,
I & 2 Gao. 5, c. 46, §1(3). The provision of the English act is modeled after Article 4(4) of the
Berne Convention, as revised at Rome, June 2, x928.
A publication presupposes the preservation, in tangible form, of the work concerned so that it is
capable of being made available to others. It is for this reason that the performance of a play is not a
publication of the play. This viewpoint, which the writer shares with others, is reinforced by an
examination of Article VI of the Universal Copyright Convention:
" Tublication,' as used in this Convention, means the reproduction in tangible form and
the general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read or
otherwise visually perceived."
[The Universal Copyright Convention was drafted at a UNESCO copyright conference held from
August x8 to September 6, 1952 in Geneva, Switzerland. The United States was a signatory of the
Convention. The State Department has expressed the desire that the Senate ratify the Convention. See
Secretary of State Dulles' letter accompanying President Eisenhower's Executive M, issued June so, 1953,
sent to the Senate].
"Ile copyright definition of the term "copy" bears this point out:
"A copy is that which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing
it the idea created by the original."
Bailey, J., in West v. Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 743 (1822), cited with approval in White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (xo7).
"'A two or three dimensional model or design for a work of art may be copied by a completed
structure based on the model or design. One seeing the completed structure will be seeing a larger
representation of the underlying model or design. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkofiler, 16 F. Supp. 729
(M. D. Pa. 1936). But this is not the case where the information embodied in a plan is turned into a
structure.
It might be noted that Section 13 of the statutory copyright law (17 U. S. C. (Supp. 1952)) requires
the proprietor of published works, including architectural technical writings, to deposit "two complete
copies of the best edition thereof then published." The Copyright Office has yet to announce that it has
either required or received two completed structures as copies of published plans, drawings, and designsI
7 The correct rule, it is submitted, was enunciated by Vann, J., in Tabor v. Hoffman, x18 N. Y.
30, 31, 23 N. E. 12, 13 (1889) a case concerning a breach of trust. A repairman was entrusted with
a set of construction patterns to aid him in repairing a pump. The repairman made a copy of these
patterns for the defendant. The court held:
"... the patterns were a secret device that was not disclosed by the publication of the
pump . . . While the defendant could lawfully copy the pump, because it had been pub-
lished to the world, he could not lawfully copy the patterns, because they had not been
published, but were still, in every sense, the property of the plaintiff, who owned not only
the material substance, but also the discovery which they embodied."
The construction of a work of architecture is not a publication thereof in most of the countries of
the world. See e.g., the United Kingdom's Copyright Act, 591, I & 2 GEo. 5, c. 46, §1(3); Article
4(4) of the Berne Convention, as revised at Rome, June 2, 1928. "For the same reason the building
will not be a publication of the plans." COP'NOER oN CoPYIGHr 213, note (i)_
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For the reasons set forth above, the writer concludes that neither the filing of
plans in a governmental office, nor the erection of the structure described in such
plans constitutes a general publication of the plans.
Nevertheless, the cases of Wright v. Eisle,71 Gendell v. Orr,72 and Kurfiss v.
Cowherd,73 until distinguished or reversed, represent the only known American case
law on the subject. Counsel may avoid the disastrous commercial consequences of
those decisions by advising the architect to affix the appropriate statutory notice of
copyright in the proper place on each plan, drawing or design before it is filed for
building permit purposes.7 4 Should other courts hold that the above decisions truly
represent the law, the acts of filing or construction will become general publications
ending the period of common law copyright. However, since the "published" work
will have already had affixed to it the required notice of copyright, the creator of
the architectural plan, drawing or design will immediately be eligible to register a
claim to statutory copyright. This point will be developed in the Statutory Copy-
right section which follows 5
STATUTORY COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
An architectural creation is capable of protection at three stages: (a) as a two
dimensional technical writing, that is, as a plan, drawing or design; (b) as a two
dimensional artistic representation of the projected structure-or as a three di-
mensional model of said structure; and (c) as a completed structure.
All three stages are protected in most of the countries of the world, including
the United Kingdom.76  Unhappily for the American architect, such is not the case
in the United States. Architectural plans, drawings, and designs have been the
subject of statutory protection in this country only since the passage of the Copy-
right Act of 19o9.77 It is not yet clear, to what extent, if any, this statute protects
the completed structure itself. This uncertainty stems from the language of the act.
In addition to the basic right "to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copy-
righted work, 7 the statute grants a collateral right "to complete, execute and finish
" 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N. Y. Supp. 887 (2d Dep't 1903).
in 13 Phila. 191 (1879).
23 3 Mo. App. 397, 121 S. V. 2d 282 (1938).
" The above procedure should also be followed where architectural writings are being filed for
financing purposes as well. Indeed, the notice of copyright should be affixed should there be any possi-
bility that the writings will be taken from the drafting rooms for any purposes.
" See pages 246-247 infra, and cases and notes there cited. See also Katz, Is Notcie of Copyright
Necessary in Works Published Abroad?-A Query and a Quandary, WAls. U. L. Q. 55 (Vol. z953, No.
.
0 See the fine discussion of the architectural provisions of the British statutes and the Berne Con-
vention in COPINGER ON COPYIIGHT 209-215.
"Act of March 4, 1909, 35 STAT. 1075 (igog) et seq., which act, as amended, is currently the
law and codified as 17 U. S. C. (Supp. 1952). Registration of the two-dimensional technical writings of
an architect is now possible under §5(i) of this act. This section covers: "Drawings or plastic works
of a scientific or technical charater." See Regulations of the Copyright Office in 37 CoDE FED. RiEs.
c. If, §202.10 (1948). See also CoPYRIrr LAws osF Ta UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Copyright Office
1952).
78 17 U. S. C. §i(a).
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it [the copyrighted work] if it be a model or design for a work of art. ' 78  However,
there is no express provision in the current law, as there is in the English copyright
act, which affords copyright protection to an architectural work such as a building or
other stucture s°
The creator of a copyrighted model or design for a work of art has the exclusive
right to execute and complete the contemplated structure or object. Architecture
is one of the arts. The Copyright Office has long accepted models or designs of
architectural works such as dwelling places, mausoleums, and other structures for
registration as models or designs for works of art.!' It would appear that an archi-
tect may obtain the exclusive right to build the structure he has designed if he
registers a claim to copyright in his model or design-as opposed to merely copy-
righting his plans! 2 Indeed, a leading modern text writer has declared:"3
... no good reason seems to exist, under this section [i(b)], why adequate protection may
not be obtained by architects if they copyright their models or designs.
The right under Section i(b) is apparently limited to completing the con-
templated work only. Thus, if an architect designed a civic monument and copy-
righted his design or model, he had the exclusive right "to complete, execute and
finish it." But having once constructed the monument, others could now freely
copy it-provided they did not thereby copy those technical writings which the
architect may have also copyrighted.
To the architect who designs "one of a kind" structures, such as bridges, sky-
scrapers, and luxurious custom-built houses, the protection afforded by Section i (b)
is adequate. This would not be the case where the architect was engaged in de-
signing private dwellings for small rental units. Here repetition, with limited vari-
ations, of the basic model or design is the means whereby the architect collects the
bulk of his fees. Section i(b), under the above interpretation, would protect him
only in the completion of the first structure. Thereafter, such protection as was
available would have to come from the copyrighting of his technical writings: his
plans, drawings, and designs.
Section i(a), which grants to the copyright proprietor the exclusive right "to
print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work," extends its protection to
architectural plans, drawings, and designs.84 No other section of the copyright law
is applicable to these technical writings. The section is designed solely to prevent
17 17 U. S. C. §s(b) (Supp. i952). These models or designs are registered under §5(g) of the current
law. See Regulations of the Copyright Office in 37 CODE FED. REGS. c. II, §202.8 (1948).
The Act of July 8, 1870, §86, was apparently the first federal copyright act to protect "models or de-
signs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts." The exclusive right was given to execute and
finish them.
"Copyright Act, 19v1, I & 2 GEo. 5, c. 46, §§1, 35(). Meikle v. Maufe, 85 S. J. 378 (t94t).
"8In a reply to a letter by the writer, Mr. Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights, indicated his Office
has made many registrations of such models and designs. He, of course, rendered no opinion as to the
judicial interpretation of the scope of such copyrights.
"See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier, x6 F. Supp. 729 (M. D. Pa. 1936) (memorial).
,
3 WEIL, AMERICAN CoP'RoHr LAw 83, 84 (1917).
8See note 34 supra.
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the protected work from being "copied," that is, there may be no unauthorized
printing, reprinting, publishing, copying or vending of the work. Any use of the
intellectual production which does not constitute a copying is not an infringement of
Section i(a).
The creators of such intellectual productions as books, periodicals and maps are
adequately protected under Section i(a). The moment a book, periodical or map
is published, it can be fully exploited, culturally as well as commercially. These
works need merely be sold to be of value to their creators, and to be read, to be of
value to the user. Nothing more must be done. The prevention of copying gives
the authors of these works all the protection they need.
However, there are many intellectual productions which are neither economically
nor intellectually complete when rendered solely as published copies. Music is not
fully exploited merely by the printing of notes on paper. It springs into life only
when these notes are played. A lecture may be enjoyed when published as a book;
nevertheless, to be fully exploited, it is necessary that it be delivered before an audi-
ence. Dramatic works (and these include motion pictures) may be read and dis-
seminated as plays and scripts. However, they are of limited value unless they are
performed. A representation of a contemplated piece of sculpture will not impart
the true nature of the work until the representation is executed. By the same token,
an architect's plans, drawings, and designs are of little practical value until their
information is turned into a structure. Clearly, something additional must be done
with certain works to make them more valuable to the creator and the public.
Section i(a) is concerned solely with the "copy-right." It is incapable of ade-
quately protecting works which are primarily intended to be played, delivered, per-
formed or executed. As a result, the creators of all these classes of works, with one
notable exception, are given certain additional exclusive rights. Thus, in addition
to his copy-right, the composer of copyrighted music enjoys the exclusive right to
arrange and adapt his music,"5 and to control its public performance for profit88
and its recordation or mechanical reproduction8 7
Architectural plans, drawings, and designs are no more an end in themselves
than is a piece of sheet music. They are primarily intended to be executed, to be
turned into structures. The publishing and vending of copies is purely incidental.
Nevertheless, under the current copyright law, the architect does not have the ex-
clusive right to build the structures embodied in his technical writings. He is
limited to such protection as is afforded him by his "copy-right" in these writings.
Accordingly, we turn to a discussion of the "copy-right," what it protects and the
means whereby it is infringed.
The copyright protection of a work under Section i (a) does not extend to the
words or ideas used.88 It embraces solely the arrangement of the words"9 or the ex-
17 U. S. C. §r(b) (Supp. 1952). " 1d. §I(e). 87Ibid.
s This point is too well established to require references to authorities. However, the reader is re-
ferred to the careful statement of Judge Erle in Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. Cas. 8x5, 867, io Eng. Rep.
68r, 702 (1854) which is quoted on page 232 supra.
"' "A copyright extends only to the arrangement of the words. A copyright does not give a
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pression of the ideas.90 Copyright in a work does not prevent others from using
the information it contains,9 1 from employing the systems it explains92 or from con-
structing the devices it describes.0 3
To be protected, a work need merely be original, that is, the product of one's own
labors. Novelty is no factor. These points have been noted previously. 4  It is
thus conceivable that the material to which protection is extended may parallel or
even be identical with matter long in the public domain. As Judge Learned Hand
has remarked."'
[the work in question] ... must be deemed to be original, if by original one means that
it was the spontaneous, unsuggested result of the author's imagination. . . . this ...
squarely raises the question whether it be a defense to a copyright that the precise work
has independently appeared before it and is in the public domain.
Section 7 [now Section 8] ...provides that "no copyright shall subsist in the original
text of any work which is in the public domain." This is not new law, and means no
more than that by taking such a text you may not get a copyright upon it.... It has no
application whatever to a work which is of original composition, because such a work is
not the "original" text of any work in the public domain, but a second and equally
"original" text of a work never published before its copyright.
The copyright law, unlike the patent law, has no doctrine of anticipation.Y0
Originality is the sole test of the validity of a copyright. 7  But the whole work need
not be original. As Drone has pointed out:9
monopoly in any incident in a play. Other authors have a right to exploit the facts, experiences, field
of thought, and general ideas, provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form in whiclh the
circumstances and ideas have been developed, arranged, and put into shape." (Italics supplied.) Manton,
D. J., in Eichel v. Marcin, 24! Fed. 404, 408, 409 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S.
82 (1899).
00 ". . . only in the 'expression' of a copyrighted work does any monopoly inhere; the 'theme,' the
'plot,' the 'ideas' may always be freely borrowed." Per curiam [L. Hand, A. N. Hand, Clark], Dellar v.
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 15o F. 2d 6X2 (2d Cir. 1945).
"
1 Information of any kind, valuable though it might be, is not, as such, protected by copyright. As
indicated in note go, supra, only the "expression" of the information is protectible.
As Judge Learned Hand has pointed out: ". . . it has never been very satisfactorily established, and
probably never can be, at what point a plagiarism ceases to copy the expression of an author's ideas and
steals only the ideas themselves." Fitch v. Young, 23o Fed. 743, 745-746 (S. D. N. Y. xg6).
92 Baker v. Selden, ox U. S. 99 (z879). See also, the "Bank Night" cases which concerned the
attempt to protect motion picture advertising and promotion systems, Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gruber,
86 F. 2d 958 (ist Cir. 1936); Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gantz, 86 F. 2d 596 (roth Cir. 1936).
"3Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). Note that this
decision states defendant could use plaintiff's copyrighted drawing in designing and constructing a bridge
approach. However, the discussion is silent as to whether the drawing could be copied in the process.
The decision should be read with this point in mind.
Of course, where the copyright grants an exclusive execution right, as with models and designs
for works of art, the right to construct the described device is barred by the copyright. See p. 238
supra, and notes and cases there cited.
"' See pages 231-232 supra, and cases and notes there cited.
'" Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145, 149 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
9 "Two map makers, collecting at first hand, would naturally make the same map and each would
equally be entitled to copyright. In this respect copyright law differs from patent law, where a first
use bars others from the same field." BowicR, CoPvYuGo--Irs HISTORY AND ITs LAW 255 (19X2).
'Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145, 149-152 (S. D. N. Y. 1924). See Yankwich, Originality in
the Law of Intellectual Property, ii F. IL D. 457 (195').
'"DRoNE ON COPYRIGHT 199-200.
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In many cases the author has created the substance as well as the form of the composition
for which he claims copyright; and, though the sentiments and thoughts may not all be
original, neither the whole nor a material integral part of the composition can be said to
have previously existed. Popularly speaking, the work is wholly new and original. But
the law does not require that a person, to be entitled to copyright, shall be the sole creator
of the work for which protection is claimed. Labor bestowed by one person on the pro-
duction of another, if no rights are thereby invaded, will often constitute a valid claim for
copyright ... Anyone, by making material changes, additions, corrections, improvements,
notes, comments, etc., in the unprotected work of another, may create a valid claim for
copyright in a new and revised edition.
Too often courts severely limit the copyright protection of a work by "dissecting"
itP9 First they subtract from the work (assuming it to be a literary work) such
things as "old plot," "stock characters," "basic human emotions"--the common-place
materials from which all stories are fashioned. The little that remains is then
held to be protectible.0 ° It is submitted that this practice is improper. An intel-
lectual production must be viewed en masse to determine its protectibility. Obvi-
ously, every individual word in a literary work is in the public domain. A complete
exercise of literary dissection would thus destroy all claims to copyright protection.
It must be emphasized that copyright protection, does not extend to words but only
to their arrangement, nor to ideas or sentiments but solely to their expression, de-
velopment or treatment. It is the impact the creator's artistic personality has on
common-place material which sets his work apart-which makes it peculiarly his
own. It is this quality of "ownership" which the copyright protects 1
"Dissection, in the sense as employed by the writer in the text above, is to be distinguished from
its sometimes proper use to determine whether one work infringes another. See Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.ad 464 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HALv. L. REv.
1125 (rg5s), FouarH CoPmsirr LAw SMvPosiuM 2 (ASCAP 1952). See also note 505, infra.
'
0 The pitiful results of this dissection technique may be noted in the series of recent California
Supreme Court decisions: Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 97 U. S. P. Q. 545, 40 A. C. 813, 256 P. 2d 947 (Sup.
Ct. Calif. April 29, X953); Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 97 U. S. P. Q. 556, 256 P. 2d
962, 4o A. C. 833 (Sup. Ct. Calif. April 29, 1953); Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 97 U. S. P. Q.
567, 4o A. C. 857, 256 P. 2d 933 (Sup. Ct. Calif. April 29, 1953). See note ioi infra.
1 1 "Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy. . . . The copy is
the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in
the words of the act." Mr. Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S.
239, 249-250 (1903). (Italics supplied.)
A recent review of a western novel, which is here set forth, is directly in point:
"This department is always delighted to receive anything by Frank O'Rourke. There's
really nothing new in the plot of his latest, "Gun Hand" (Ballantine, $2 cloth, 35c paper).
John McCabe isn't the first hero of Western fiction to prove himself strong when others are
weak, efficient when others stumble. Other fictional towns, like Niobebe, have been under
the thumb of a well-organized outlaw gang which loots the wagon trains, kills teamsters
and runs crooked games as a sideline. Other men, like McCabe, have been forced to
buckle on their guns when matters came to a showdown, and countless other men have
found soft arms about their necks on the final page. The difference between "Gun Hand"
and the run-of-the-mill Western is O'Rourke, who again shows the same skill in narra-
tion, in character portrayal and in sustained action that earned 'Concannon' and 'The
Gun' this column's highest praise. A triple A, therefore, to O'Rourke and "Gun Hand."
It's a pippin[" (Italics supplied.) Hoffman Birney, Roundup on the Western Range,
N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1953, §7, pt. I, p. 36, Col. 3. See also note 46 supra.
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Lines, curves, angles, and squares are some of the "geometric words" used by an
architect in his technical writings. These words of his are clearly in the public do-
main. Every architectural plan, drawing, and design is an amalgam of lines, curves,
angles, and squares. Subtracting them from a technical writing would leave the
architect without any protectible property. This "syllogism" is neither logically nor
legally correct.
It is the arrangement of the lines, curves, angles, and squares which enables the
architect to express his artistic personality. Admittedly, he is working with indi-
vidual materials, each of which has been known since time immemorial. If the
architect's arrangements and modes of expression are original, are his alone, are not
copied from the work of others or consciously appropriated from arrangements and
modes of expression in the public domain, then his technical writings are eligible
for copyright protection. His technical writings may be common-place in concep-
tion, undistinguished in design, and unimaginative in make-up. His profession
and the uninspired public may consider his work "unoriginal," "old hat," "nothing
really new." Nevertheless, this architect's writings are copyrightable; ". . the
'originality' required [by copyright law] refers to the form of expression and not to
novelty in the subject matter."10 2
The technical writings of an architect are infringed when a substantial part of
the protectible material has been copied. This is the same rule applicable to all
works protected under Section i(a)Y ° As indicated previously,104 the doctrine of
"fair-use" permits a limited or non-substantial amount of copying. What, then, is
a substantial copying? This is more a question of quality than quantity. The test
appears to be: If that portion of a work is taken upon which its commercial or
artistic success depends, the taking will be deemed substantial, regardless of the
small volume which the misappropriated portion bears to the total mass of the
work 05 Thus, the copying of a single key musical phrase from a popular song
102Frank, C. J., in Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 15o F. 2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
"'2 "The true test of piracy ... is not whether a composition is copied in the same language or the
exact words of the original, but whether in substance it is reproduced; not whether the whole, but
whether a material part, is taken." DRONE ON Cos'I, uorr 385.
"Where [architectural] plans are alleged to be infringed by other plans or sketches, the question to be
decided is similar to that arising in connection with other artistic works .... " COsINGSR ON CoPYmoin'
214.
See Ideal Aeroplane & Supply Co., Inc. v. Brooks, z8 F. Supp. 936 (E. D. N. Y. X937) (preliminary
injunction granted), 34 U. S. P. Q. 370 (E. D. N. Y. 1937) (infringement found at trial on merits) (the
technical writing here concerned was a diagrammatic instruction sheet showing method of assembling a
ship model).
o" See pages 228-229 supra, and cases and notes there cited.
...Extracts from three cases set forth below clearly enunciate the rule:
"In order to constitute an infringement of the copyright of a book it is not necessary
that the whole or even a large portion of the book shall have been copied. It is sufficient
if a material and substantial part shall have been copied, even though it be but a small
part of the whole." Maris, J., in Henry Holt & Co., Inc. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
23 F. Supp. 302, 303 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
"A part, however small, of a work which is appropriated is material where the result
of the appropriation is the suggestion or impression of similarity or identity." Lehman,
J., in Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 292, 171 N. E. 56, 6o (1930).
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was held to be a substantial taking.3°
For a plaintiff to prevail in a copyright infringement suit, he must establish that
the defendant copied from his work and that this copying was not a fair use and
was, therefore, an infringement0 7  However, as Judge Learned Hand has indi-
cated: 0'
One may infringe a patent by the innocent reproduction of the machine patented, but the
law imposes no prohibition upon those who, without copying, independently arrive at
the precise combination of words or notes which have been copyrighted.
Where the subject matter of intellectual productions is by nature similar, as
would be the case with ranch-house-style residences containing a set number of
rooms, the resulting plans of two different architects could contain close resem-
blances. The legal question is whether these resemblances have naturally resulted
from a general use of common sources and materials open to both architects, or
whether one architect used the work of the other as a model, copying from it rather
than drawing from the common sources. °
In every case concerning infringement by copying, the courts look for some
evidence of access, for some indication that the defendant had contact with, or
knowledge or awareness of, the plaintiff's work. But access, after all, is only a piece
of circumstantial evidence. Striking similarities and repetition of common errors are
but two means of satisfying the proof of lack of access.' l
The most obvious means of infringing a copyrighted architectural plan, drawing,
and design is to copy directly from the original work itself. This may be accom-
plished by a tracing, photograph or other mode of direct reproduction.
Infringement by copying, however, may also be done indirectly." It may be
"... the defendant has not appropriated the entire copyrighted work, but he has ma-
terially diminished the value of complainant's work and appropriated its labors to an in-
jurious extent. This constitutes infringement." Hollister, D. J., in Meccano v. Wagner,
234 Fed. 912, 922 (S. D. Ohio 1916).
Whether the copying is of such nature as to be an infringement is a question of fact to be determined
by laymen and not by experts. Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 930, 931-32 (2d Cir. 19X4); Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946).
.00 Boosey v. Empire Music Co., Inc., 224 Fed. 646, 647 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) (phrase: "I hear you
calling me" with accompanying music almost identical with that of plaintiff's).
... Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
... Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145, 147 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
... Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768, 793, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4.436, at 626 (C. C. D. Mass. 1845).
"' "Substantial identity, or a striking resemblance, between the work complained of and that for
which protection is claimed, creates a presumption of unlawful copying, which must be overcome by the
defendant." DRONE ON CoPYIuonr 400; Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,136, 26, 6o (C. C. D.
Mass. x869).
"Errors in typography and in matter appearing in appellant's book first occurred in appellee's. There
were enough errors to repel any theory of accidental coincidence and to warrant a finding of intentional
trespass upon appellees property. Such a situation justified a further finding that appellant's copying
was not confined to copying appellee's mistakes." Baker, C. J., in Investment Service Co. v. Fitch
Publishing Co., 291 Fed. ioio (7 th Cir. 1923).
"" "Infringement may be by indirect as well as by direct copying. In the case of Cate v. Devon in
x889, in the Chancery Court, the defense that the copying was not from the original copyright work but
from a newspaper reprint, was rejected." BowyxR. CoPsvurrr-Ivs HistoRY AND ITs LAW 254 (1912) -
See also Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 930 (2d Cir. 1914) (The decision in this case was rendered
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done from memory 1 2  The infringer may once have seen the plans, and later
commits their features to paper. The moment he does so, he has made an in-
fringing copy of them." 3  He will also infringe, although he may never have seen
the original plans, if he makes a copy of them pursuant to the instructions of one
who has. The same result obtains where he copies a plan from one who has copied
the original." 4 Clearly, infringement by copying may occur unintentionally. This
is so since the copyright law does not require an intent to copy, other than where
a criminal action for willful infringement is being brought."" Nevertheless, a show-
ing of the intention to copy or "steal" is valuable in determining whether basic
similarities constitute an infringement or are merely coincidental."'
In the absence of proof of direct copying of architectural plans, drawings or
designs, it is necessary to prove copying by other means. Here the analogy to the
proving of infringement of copyrighted music is particularly apt. One infringes
a music copyright by copying down the music he hears being performed-whether
the performance is by a "live" orchestra or by a phonograph record." 7 Neither the
interpretive rendition of the orchestra, nor the phonograph record itself, is pro-
tected under the copyright law." If there has been a substantial copying of the
by Judge Lacombe. The writer considers it one of the best reasoned copyright cases he has ever
read).
... Freudenthal v. Hebrew Publishing Co., 44 F. Supp. 754 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
... The wrong lies in making an unauthorized copy of a work in which the "right to copy" is vested
in another. This elementary concept is often overlooked. It was duly noted, however, in Foreign
& Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F. 2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952).
"' The fact that the one making the copy may not realize he is committing a wrong in following the
advice of another is no bar to his legal liability. To hold otherwise would prevent 'the copyright
proprietor from effectively protecting his property. See note I1S, infra.
"It has been held that one who copies from a plagiarist is himself necessarily a plagiarist, however,
innocent he may be (American Press Assoc. v. Daily Story Publishing Co., o20 Fed. Rep. 766 (C. C. A. 7)
* The wrong is copying; that is, using the author's work as a source. A copy of a copy does indeed do
just that...." Per curiam, Barry v. Hughes, 103 F. 2d 427 (2d Cir. 1939) (L. Hand, Clark, Patterson).
"' "To constitute piracy, it is not necessary that there shall have been on the part of the wrong-doer
an intention to pirate. His motives in taking the whole or a part of the copyrighted work may have
been . . . commendable . . .In applying the law, the thing done and its effect, and not the intention
with which it is done, are the controlling considerations." DRONE ON CoPYcsT 401, 402. See also
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,136, 26, 6o (C. C. D. Mass. 1869).
The statutory copyright provisions on willful infringement are contained in 17 U. S. C. §§so4, 115
(Supp. X952).
""' ,,.. Where it can be readily shown that there has been material copying, it matters not with
what intent the copying was done; but where it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the copying ...
the animas urandi may aid in the solution of the question." DRONE ON CoPYuu1Gr 402.
Accord: Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F. 2d a (9 th Cir. 1933); Meccano v. Wagner, 234 Fed.
912 (S. D. Ohio 1916).
"' Cf., Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
See page 239 supra, for those rights, in addition to his "copy-right," which are enjoyed by the owner
of copyrighted music.
""A phonograph record is not a copy of a musical work since it has been held to be a part of an
instrument reproducing sound; as such it is not copyrightable. 'White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U. S. 1 (1907).
Interpretive renditions are not protected by statutory copyright. Further, any common law rights
which a performer might have in his rendition cease upon the release of the recorded performance to
the public. R.C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). Contra: Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ad. 631 (1937).
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music, an infringement occurs, notwithstanding that the thing or object from which
the music is copied is itself not capable of copyright protection. " The same result
follows where architectural writings are concerned.
Perhaps the most usual method of copying architectural plans, drawings, and
designs is that where the infringer actually copies from the completed edifice and
not directly from the copyrighted technical writings themselves. The structure, it is
clear, is not eligible for copyright protection. Nevertheless, if one paces off distances,
measures angles, takes photographs, makes sketches and notes, and, from these varied
acts, proceeds to put the information thus garnered on to paper in the form of a plan,
drawing or design, an infringement by copying has occurred.'20
By its very nature, no modern structure designed for human use or habitation
may be built without reference to the technical writings of an architect. Further-
more, no building permits may be granted unless approved plans, drawings, and
designs have been filed in the appropriate governmental offices. Nor can financing
be arranged with private or governmental lenders unless these same writings are
examined and approved. Where architectural plans, drawings, and designs are
found to be infringed, the court will order the destruction of all infringing copies.' 2 1
A permanent injunction will also issue against further copying of these copyrighted
writings. 2 2 It will thus be possible effectively to halt the building activities of the
infringer. He will have no infringing copies available for building permit or loan
purposes, and none for use on the job. The infringer is not denied the right to use
the information or ideas expressed in the original technical writings. He is merely
enjoined from copying the copyrighted technical writings, and is made to give up
all offending copies.
An architect's rights under statutory copyright are limited. He does not have
the exclusive right to execute his technical writings. He most probably has the
right to complete, execute, and finish the structure which is based upon his copy-
righted model or design ' s In all other cases, other persons may build the structures
.1. This is not an improper extension of the concept of copyright. Copying a recording by making
a pressing of it is not a violation of the "copy-right" in the music-although it is certainly an act of
unfair competition. (It may, under certain circumstances, be a violation of the "recording right" in the
music, see page 239 and notes 86, 87 supra.) However, making a copy of the musical notes themselves
is a violation of the copyright. See page 244 and notes r53, 114 supra.
..0 The test of infringement is whether the questioned work is "recognizable by an ordinary observer
as having been taken from the copyrighted source. Such is an infringement." Manton, C. J., in Fleischer
Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, 73 F. 2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934).
"Infringement may be through quite a different medium from the original. BowxER, Copy-
rourr-ITs HisToRy AND ITS LAw 254 (1912). Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,136, 26, 59-6o
(C. C. D. Mass. 1869). Thus, disguising the source from which the infringer took his material does
not defeat plaintiff's copyright. King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924).
The structure itself may be copied provided the plans are not thereby also copied, see note 70
supra, and page 246 infra.
There need be no literal copying for an infringement to occur, "... else a plagiarist would escape
by immaterial variations." L. Hand, C. J., in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119 , 12(2d Cir. 1930). See note 103, supra. For the effect on the charge of copyright infringement of
material variations, see page 246 and note 124 infra.
17 U. S. C. §ioi(d) (Supp. 1952). 2.2 Id. §iox(a).
222 See pages 237-239 supra, and notes thereto.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
he has designed. However, they must build these structures without copying his
copyrighted plans, drawings, and designs. This is the sole effective measure of
protection available to the architect.
Enforcement of an architect's copy-right creates no threat of monopoly. If
persons wish to build from his technical writings, let them buy their copies from
him. If they wish to profit from his ideas, techniques, and theories in drafting their
own technical writings, let them, provided their resultant writings are so materially
altered as to constitute non-infringing "new works.' 4
For an architect to obtain such protection as is available to him under statutory
copyright law, he must carefully comply with its many technical requirements.
Thus, he must publish his plans, drawings, and designs with a valid notice of
copyright' 5  To be valid the notice must be in the proper form,120 must be appliea
in the proper place,127 and must appear on every authorized reproduction of these
writings."' Publication with a valid notice of copyright merely preserves the work's
eligibility for copyright. A claim of copyright must still be registered' 2D  Promptly
after publication of his work, the claimant must deposit "two complete copies of
the best edition thereof" in the Copyright Office in order to "perfect" his copyright."'
Until copies are deposited, no suit for infringement can be maintained.''
For the convenience of the Copyright Office, Section 5 of the copyright law
classifies works for copyright registration purposes' 3 2  Architectural plans, draw-
ings, and designs are contained within subdivision (i), 3 3 while models and designs
for architectural structures fall into subdivision (g)j a  Works within these sub-
divisions are permitted a number of variations in the form of the copyright notice.185
However, the safest notice, and by far the simplest, is cast in this form: Copyright
by John Doe.
Although common law copyright concerns itself solely with unpublished works,
124 Under copyright principles the protected matter may not be copied. Making immaterial changes
in the arrangement of the protected work or in its mode of expression, will not cloak an infringement.
However, one may take the copyrighted work and materially alter it so that a "new work" is evolved.
This second work is new in the sense that it is different in arrangement, expression, and treatment from
its source. It is not its copy. The new work is itself capable of copyright protection.
".... even assuming the book to have suggested the Chinese den feature to the writer of the [motion
picture] scenario, he has brought about such a material alteratlion in the constituent parts of the series
of events, and in the sequence of the events in the series, as to escape the charge of plagiarism with
respect thereto." Knox, J., in Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors, 283 Fed. 223, 228 (S. D. N. Y. 1922).
(Italics supplied.)
1251 7 U. S. C. §ro (Supp. x952). 1261d. §19.
227 Id. §20. 128 Id. §1o. 12 9 1d. §sx.
"'Id. §§13, 14. For a discussion of this point and of the copyright formalities noted above, see
Katz, Is Notice of Copyright Necessary in Works Published Abroad?-A Query and a Quandary, WAsti.
U. L. Q. 55 (Vol. 1953, No. i).
131 X7 U. S. C. §13 . See Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 3o6 U. S. 30 (1939).
152 X7 U. S. C. §5 (Supp. r952). It was within this section that the architect's technical writings arc
first expressly mentioned in United States copyright law. See page 237 supra, and note 77 thereto. See
also the House of Representative's Committee Report on Bill Enacting Copyright Act of i909, set forth
in HowELL, Tin COPYRIGHT LAW 253, 264 (3d ed. 1952).
rId. §5(i). Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character. See note 77 supra.
"Id. §5(g). Works of art; models or designs for works of art. See note 35 supra.
" Id. §x9. These concern means of abbreviating the notice.
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United States statutory copyright protects all published works and certain unpub-
lished works as well-provided these comply with its requirements. This latter
class includes works which are not "realizable" or fully exploited unless something
additional is done with them. Within this grouping are such intellectual pro-
ductions as musical and dramatic works, works of art, and the technical writings
of the architect. Section 12 of the copyright law describes these unpublished cre-
ations as "works not reproduced for sale."1 "
An architect does not generally intend to sell his technical writings outright as
published copies. Instead, he receives royalties for the use of these writings and
other fees for his accompanying professional services. Accordingly, these unpub-
lished writings are registerable under the above section of the copyright law. Only
one copy of these unpublished writings need be deposited.'37  Unpublished works
are not required to bear a notice of copyright' 3 8 Nevertheless, since the law is un-
certain as to which acts constitute a general publication, it is certainly the wisest course
to apply the notice of copyright, as required by published works, in the proper place
on each of the architect's technical writings before these writings leave the drafting
room.
It should be noted that the term of statutory copyright for both published and
unpublished works is twenty-eight years, with a second, or renewal term, for an
additional twenty-eight years' 39
A victorious architect in an infringement action is entitled to receive a number
of benefits. This includes, among other things, an injunction, 140 monetary re-
covery,' 4' destruction of the infringing material, 142 court costs,' 43 and, in some cases,
attorney's fees.'"
A brief discussion of those copyright law provisions concerning the monetary
recovery, costs, and attorney's fees is in order.
Section ioi(b) of the copyright law contains an unusual provision concerning
120id. §xa. See also pages 224, 225, 239, supra, for a discussion of the artistic and commercial
nature of these unpublished works.
...Id. §§12, 13, 14.
" See id. §§o-14. See also Howell, op. cit. supra note 132 at 107, io8 for a discussion of this
point.
IUD id. §24. The renewal copyright is a new grant of copyright. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v.
Goff, 187 Fed. 247 (ist Cir. 19xi). With certain express exceptions only the author of a work may
renew it. If he is dead when a work is eligible for renewal, the statute lists those persons who may then
renew. Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U. S. 326 (x923). As to the assignment of the renewal right
see Fred Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark, 318 U. S. 643 (i943).
Where unpublished works are concerned, the measurement of the 28 years runs from the date the
work is deposited for copyright. Marx v. United States, 96 F. 2d 204 (9 th Cir. 1938).140 x7 U. S. C. §ox (a) (Supp. 1952). The writer is here talking of a permanent injunction. If by
the time suit is brought the infringement has ceased and there is little chance that it will recur, an in-
junction might not issue. Compare, Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 95 F. 2d 48 (ad Cir. 1938), with
M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F. 2d 42 (D. Tenn. 1927).
1 r7 U. S. C. §xoi(b) (Supp. 1952). See note x45 infra, for text of this section.
"'Id. §ios(d). Under §iox(c) articles alleged to infringe the copyright may also be impounded
during the suit.
"'Id. §x16.
" Ibid. See also page 249 and note 152 infra.
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damages and profits.' 4 5 This provision declares that upon proof of an infringement
the plaintiff shall recover such damages as he has suffered by the infringement
and "all the profits" made by the infringer from such infringement. In order to
recover the foregoing amounts, the plaintiff must prove profits by proving "sales
only." Conversely, the defendant has to prove "every element of cost which he
claims."
The law recognizes that the above procedure is complicated. Therefore,
it is further stated that "in lieu of actual damages and profits" the court may
assess "such damages as ... shall appear to be just." In assessing such dam-
ages, the court, "in its discretion," may allow certain stated amounts. In the
case of architectural plans, drawings, and designs, and of models and designs for
a work of art (all of which fall within Section 5 of the copyright law), the court
may assess $i.oo for each infringing copy made, sold or found in the defendant's
possession. However, where a case falls within the provisions of the "in lieu"
clause, no award of damages may be less than $25o.oo or more than $5,ooo.oo.
Some cases will illustrate these points. Where either actual damages or actual
profits may be ascertained, the "in lieu" clause will not apply.'40 Where neither can
... The involved nature of the section warrants its reproduction:
"Damages and Profits; Amount; Other Remedies.-To pay to the copyright proprietor
such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well
as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement, and in
proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove sales only, and the defendant shall
be required to prove every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual damages
and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such dam-
ages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in case
of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, such damages shall not exceed
the sum of $20o nor be less than the sum of $5o, and in the case of the infringement
of an undramatized or nondramatic work by means of motion pictures, where the in-
fringer shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that such infringe-
ment could not have been reasonably foreseen, such damages shall not exceed the sum
of $Soo; and in the case of an infringement of a copyrighted dramatic or dramatico-
musical work by a maker of motion pictures and his agencies for distribution thereof to
exhibitors, where such infringer shows that he was not aware that he was infringing a
copyrighted work, and that such infringements could not reasonably have been foreseen,
the entire sum of such damages recoverable by the copyright proprietor from such in-
fringing maker and his agencies for the distribution to exhibitors of such infringing
motion picture shall not exceed the sum of $5,ooo nor be less than $250, and such damages
shall in no other case exceed the sum of $5,ooo nor be less than the sum of $25o, and
shall not be regarded as a penalty. But the foregoing exceptions shall not deprive the
copyright proprietor of any other remedy given him under this law, nor shall the limitation
as to the amount of recovery apply to infringements occurring after the actual notice to
a defendant, either by service of process in a suit or other written notice served upon him.
"First. In the case of a painting, statue, or sculpture, $io for every infringing copy
made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
"Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section 5 of this title, except a
painting, statue, or sculpture, $i for every infringing copy made or sold by or found
in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
"Third. In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, $5o for every infringing delivery;
"Fourth. In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or orchestral
composition, $Soo for the first and $5o for every subsequent infringing performance;
in the case of other musical compositions $io for every infringing performance." (Italics
supplied.)
2" Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., io6 F. 2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939) (damages); Davilla v.
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be established, the court may then award statutory damages. 4 Thus, where there
is but one infringing copy made of an architect's technical writings, the court
cannot award $I.oo-it must award at least $25o.oo' The $i.oo figure is important
only where there are two hundred and fifty or more infringing copies. In that
event, by awarding merely $i.oo for each infringing copy, the plaintiff would still
receive $25o.oo. However, even here the court could award statutory damages up
to $5,ooo.oo to cover all the infringing copies- 49 The court's discretion, of course, is
affected by the equities in the case. It must be noted that the minimum or
maximum provisions of Section ioi (b) are not applicable should the defendant con-
tinue to infringe after he has received "actual notice ... either by service of process
in a suit or other written notice served upon him."' 50
Under Section ii6 of the copyright law, the court will allow full costs and "may
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."' 1 The
award of attorney's fees is often substantial in light of the judgments obtained. In
a recent case a judgment for $5,ooo.oo was coupled with an attorney's fee of
$2,ooo.ooY52 This is cited to indicate that a potential plaintiff as well as prospective
infringer might think twice before incurring the risks of copyright litigation.
This article opened with a series of questions. The writer trusts he has answered
them correctly. Architectural plans, drawings, and designs are not sui generis as
intellectual productions. The protection granted these technical writings under
common law and statutory copyright principles is similar in scope to that accorded
the intellectual productions of authors, artists, and composers. This protection is
adequate. It is not complete. A fuller measure of relief may be possible by drawing
upon other fields of law-upon those of contracts, torts, and unfair competition, to
name a few'>3
Brunswick-Balke Collender, 94 F. 2d 567 (2d Cir. 1938) (profits). For the measurement of lost profits
see Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 23o Fed. 412, 414 (2d Cir. x916); Taft v. Smith, Gray & Co., 76
Misc. 283, 134 N. Y. Supp. ioui (Sup. Ct. z912) (unpublished work protected under common law
copyright).
1 7 Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 209 (935); Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F. 2d 664
(7th Cir. 1950).
548 Cravens v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n, 26 F. 2d 833 (M. D. Tenn. 1924).
1. Krafft v. Cohen, 32 F. Supp. 821 (E. D. Pa. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 117 F. 2d 579
(3d Cir. 1941) (also spelled Kraft).
0 Turner v. Crowley, 252 Fed. 749 (gth Cir. x918).
101 17 U. S. C. §116 (Supp. 1952).
... Contemporary Arts v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 93 F. Supp. 739 (D. C. Mass. 195o), al'd, 193
F. 2d x62 (ist Cir. 1951).
as The law of copyright does not claim to be the alpha and omega of protection for intellectual
productions. Thus, many acts, which are actionable wrongs in other fields of law, escape censure when
examined solely under copyright principles. The cases and text writers in the Appendix to this article
reveal some of those collateral legal principles upon which further protection may be predicated.
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APPENDIX
NoN-COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF ARCHITECTURAL PLANS,
DRAWINGS, AND DESIGNS
I
Unfair competition as a result of a "passing or palming off" has long been the
object of judicial censure. "B, in banking on A's fine reputation passes off his
own (B's) work as that of A." This is the classic example. Perhaps the more
usual method today is that where "B misappropriates A's work and passes it off as his
own (B's)." This concept of passing off was recognized by Justice Holmes in Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 247 (1918). As pointed out
by Judge Caffey in Jerome v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 58 F. Supp. 13,
15 (S. D. N. Y. 1944) ".... misappropriation probably is the key to modern unfair
competition theory." The cases set forth below illustrates this premise.
Unjust Enrichment
i. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (i918) (De-
fendant's misappropriation of plaintiff's labor, skill, and organization in the collection
of news held unjust enrichment). See also the well reasoned lower court decisions:
Associated Press v. International News Service, z4o Fed. 983 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); 245
Fed. 244 (2d Cir. 1917).
2. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., ioi N. Y. S. 2d
483 (i95o), afl'd, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 795 (Ist Dep't i951) (recording radio broadcast of
opera performance).
3. Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 17x Fed. 951 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 19o9) (copying of
phonograph records).
4. Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Armstrong, 132 Fed. 711 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
19o4) (copying of process in manufacturing of records).
5- Meccano v. Wagner, 234 Fed. 912 (S. D. Ohio i916), rev'd in part, 246 Fed.
653 (6th Cir. 1918) (improper appropriation of business methods and system).
6. That the wrong where non-copyrightable material is appropriated is the taking
of the plaintiff's labor, skill, and organization is clearly noted when Hebrew Pub-
lishing Co. v. Scharfstein, 288 N. Y. 374, 43 N. E. 2d 449 (1942) is compared with
Dutton v. Cupples & Leon, 117 App. Div. 172, 1O2 N. Y. S. 309 (1st Dep't 1907)
(copying of book).
II
Protection is also available where intellectual productions are obtained by breach
of contract, breach of trust or other tortious conduct of the defendant. Here the
law moves to punish the wrongful act of the defendant rather than consciously to
protect the "property" of the plaintiff. ".... an injunction may issue even though the
copied features are in the public domain and the copying would be permissible were
it not for the breach of trust or of contract or the fraud. I NIMs, THE LAW oF UN-
FAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 385 (4th ed. 1947).
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Breach of Contract
(express, implied in fact, implied in law)
I. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 (19o4) (breach
of contract not to make certain information public).
2. High v. Trade Union Courier Pub. Corp., 69 N. Y. S. 2d 526, aff'd, 89 N. Y. S.
2d 527 (1949); Cole v. Lord, Inc., 262 App. Div. 116, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 404 (1st Dep't
1941) (disclosure of ideas protected by contract).
3. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 So. CALIF. L. REv. 119 (1954).
Breach of Trust
I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 (1917) ("The
property may be denied but the confidence cannot be," Justice Holmes, id. at 102).
2. Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12 (1889) (pump patterns entrusted
to repairman).
3. Margolis v. National Bellas Hess Co., 139 Misc. 738, 249 N. Y. S. 175 (Sup.
Ct. 193), afl'd, 235 App. Div. 839, 257 N. Y. S. 912 (1st Dep't 1932) (copying of
design submitted on approval; see particularly the listing by Shientag, J., of grounds
for protection on page 741 of the trial report).
4. Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F. 2d 962 (7 th Cir. 1932) (drawings and
blueprints submitted in confidence to manufacturer).
5. ". . .the right to restrain the publication of a work upon the ground that to do
so would be a breach of trust or confidence is, it is submitted, a larger right than
the proprietary [statutory] right of copyright. There can be no copyright in ideas
or information, and it is no infringement of copyright to adopt the ideas of another
or to publish information received from another, provided there is no copying of
the language in which these ideas have, or that information has, been previously
embodied; but if the ideas or information have been acquired under such circum-
stances that it would be a breach of faith to publish them, the courts will grant an
injunction against any person who does so" (italics supplied). COPINGER ON Copy-
RIGHT 38-39.
Surreptitious Appropriation
The cases which follow illustrate the point that the tortious or inequitable conduct
of the defendant in taking non-protectible articles deprives him of the right to use
these articles even though they be free to all others.
I. Montegut v. Hickson, Inc. 178 App. Div. 94, 164 N. Y. S. 858 (1st Dep't 1917)
(dress designs).
2. Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F. 2d 104 (7th Cir. 1937) (wrap
for candy bars).
III
A work not otherwise protectible under the copyright or patent laws will be
protected against misappropriation of its non-functional features. Cheney Bros.
v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. 2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 728 (193o).
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Functional and Non-Functional Features Distinguished
I. Functional features are those essential to construction of the item concerned
so that it functions successfully and may be manufactured at a reduced cost. See 3
CALLmANN, Ti LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 1253 (2d ed. 195o ) ;
I Nims, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 370 (4th ed. 1947);
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 (1938).
2. Non-functional features "are either ornamental, or distinctive, or both. ..
(Italics supplied.) 3 CALLMANN 1259. See also I NIMS 37o.
Nature of Protection
A. Functional Features:
I. The functional features of an article not otherwise protected may be copied.
3 CALLMANN 1254; 1 NIMs 370.
2. But this copying must not confuse the public with regard to the origin of the
goods. 3 CALLMANN 1254; I NIMS 370.
3. "Such confusion does not necessarily entitle the original user to enjoin the
use of such features, but it does give him the right to demand that a competitor
adequately distinguish his product." I NIMs 371. If this is impossible, ". . . the
confusion must be accepted... ." 3 CALLMANN 1257. See also Flagg Mfg. Co. v.
Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N. E. 667 (igoI); Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey
Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960 (2d Cir. 1918).
B. Non-Functional Features:
I. The copying of non-functional features of an article not otherwise protected
may constitute unfair competition. 3 CALLMANN 1254; I NIMs 370, 378.
2. Some courts grant recovery (a) where it is shown non-functional features have
been copied on the premise the public will be deceived. The majority of courts (b)
will protect only those non-functional features which have acquired secondary mean-
ing.
The leading case illustrating point (a) above, is Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw
& Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 19o8).
The leading case illustrating point (b) above, is Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn
& Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
California follows the rule set forth in the Rushmore case. .Grant v. California
Bench Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d .706, 173 P. 2d 817 (1946).
IV
Protection Under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Trade Mark Act was enacted into law on July 5, 1946. 15 U. S. C.
§§1o51-1127, 6o STAT. 427. One of its ostensible purposes was to counteract the
effects of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) which declared that there
was no federal common law. Sections 1126(b) (h) (i) and 1127 make acts of unfair
competition affecting interstate and foreign commerce matters which come exclusive-
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF ARCHITECTURAL PLANS 253
ly within the orbit of the federal courts. It is apparently the intent of the act that
citizens and residents of the United States shall now have the same protection
against questionable business activities as the United States grants the nationals of
those countries adhering to (a) the Paris Convention of March 20, 1883 for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property, as amended at London, June 2, 1934, and (b) the Pan-
American Convention of February 20, 1929 (Washington, D. C.).
Article io bis of the London Convention and Articles 2o and 21 of the Pan-
American Convention offer a broader interpretation of acts of unfair competition
than that generally followed in the United States. Whether this broader interpreta-
tion is applicable to disputes solely between citizens or residents of the United
States is unfortunately not yet resolved. The cases and text writers set forth below
are among those who maintain that the broader basis is applicable.
I. Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F. 2d 962 (9th Cir. i95o).
2. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F. 2d 339 (9th Cir. I952).
3. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U. S. 28o (1952).
4. 4 CALLMANwN, TiE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 2208 (2d
ed. iz5o).
5. DAPmm ROBERT, CoM MENTARY ON THE LANHAM TRADE-MARK ACr, at pp. 265,
284-286 of 15 U. S. C. A. (following 5io24).
V
Patent Law Protection
See 35 U. S. C. §i et seq., 66 STAT. 7.92 (Supp. I952). See particularly sections
ioi and 102 which set forth the basis for patentability, and section 171 which concerns
design patents.
VI
Protection of Ideas
See Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 So. CALIF. L. REv. 1i9 (1954).
VII
Protection Under the Moral Right Doctrine
See Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A
Proposal, 24 So. CALIF. L. REv. 375 (1951), FoURTH COPYRIGH-T LAw SYMPOsIuM 78
(ASCAP 1952); Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554 (I94O); Granz v. Harris, 198
F. 2d 585, 590, 591 (2d Cir. 1952).
